A preliminary investigation of decentralized decision making with bounded resources

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Summary

This paper is a preliminary theoretical investigation of decentralized decision making with bounded resources. We build upon a feasible rationality concept for single agents to enable the formal investigation of the individual and group-level rationality of possibly heterogeneous, decentralized decision makers. We conjecture that it is more realistic than the centralized setting. Compared to other recent decentralized rationality notions (e.g. optimal decentralized metareasoning) our concept is stronger and not restricted to special cases (e.g. just collaborative agents). We introduce our model in detail, discuss its merits and limitations, connect it to the single-agent case, show that it is implicitly a decentralized extension of the recently successful AIXI, and provide a few application examples.

1. Introduction

This paper presents a decentralized extension and refinement of the original, single-agent concept of bounded-optimality, which is a rationality criterion for intelligent agents similarly to perfect, calculative or metalevel rationality [Russell & Subramanian, 1995]. We decided to extend it because it “seems to offer the best hope for a strong theoretical foundation for AI” [Russell & Norvig, 2010, Ch. 27, pp. 1050]. To our knowledge currently there are no general means for designing such bounded-optimal agents. We hope to advance in this direction by introducing our model, which is the main contribution of this paper.

A decentralized extension is necessary – although other agents may as well be modeled implicitly as (hidden) parts of a dynamic environment in the single-agent case – because it allows explicit representation and reasoning about other, possibly heterogeneous agents’ structure (e.g. architecture, sensors, effectors, resources, goals, beliefs, utilities, properties) and behavior (e.g. program, strategy, rationality, faultiness, competition, coordination, cooperation, interaction, selfishness, altruism), which can be more effective. It enables examination of rationality of agents both at an individual and group level in connection.

When using the proposed model one must be careful with the definition of agents’ utility. Every agent may have a different (or even the same) user/Designer-defined utility. If the utility of an agent is ill defined, then the interpretation of its rationality may be inappropriate. For example if there is a zero-sum situation (e.g. a Poker game), then if we define an agent’s utility as the sum of all the agents’ individual payoff (which is by definition zero), then the value of this agent’s utility will be zero for every possible outcome, which either means that we are indifferent toward its behavior (everything it does is considered rational), or we defined its utility function inappropriately. Eventually in this paper we try to answer the following question: given several, possibly heterogeneous decentralized, utility-driven agents with bounded resources, when are they rational?

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1 For zero-sum situations there is no point of defining a social welfare utility [Pattanaik, 2008] summing up agents’ individual valuation, since it would make no distinction between outcomes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reflects on related work. Section 3 introduces the fundamentals of bounded-optimality and AIXI \(^2\) [Hutter, 2005], which is another recently successful concept of rationality. We prove the convergence of AIXI first to perfect rationality, then (in case of more realistic assumptions) to bounded-optimality to stress its importance even further. Section 4 contains our main contribution: a decentralized extension of bounded-optimality. Section 5 gives examples of this extension. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations and an outline of future research directions.

2. Related work

There are several predecessors of our model [Russell & Subramanian, 1995]. Perfect rationality, for example, one of the earliest, classical single-agent rationality concepts, states that an agent should act so as to maximize its expected utility at every instant. This concept is not feasible in general, since it takes no account of the limited computational resources of the agent and the time needed for deliberation. Calculative rationality relaxes this assumption by allowing the agent to eventually return what would have been a perfectly rational decision at the beginning of its deliberation. This concept is more interesting in principle, but it is of less value in practice, since the actual behavior of such an agent may be far from optimal. Metalevel rationality, e.g. optimal metareasoning [Cox & Raja, 2011] responds to the previous problems by trying to optimize not only over (ground-level) actions, but also to find an optimal trade-off between the cost and value of the (object-level) computation generating these actions. The drawback of this approach is that such meta-level decision problems are often more difficult than the original (object-level) decision problems, thus optimality can only be guaranteed in special cases, e.g. when the agent’s utility is a function of the time spent for deliberation and the decision making procedure is e.g. an anytime algorithm. Bounded-optimality on the other hand makes no assumptions about the structure of agents’ program (it is not required that the agent itself be engaged in any form of metareasoning). It only requires that “[the agent’s] program is a solution to the constrained optimization problem presented by its architecture and the task environment” [Russell & Subramanian, 1995]. This means that for instance even a simple reactive agent-program based on random decisions can be bounded-optimal in a given task environment if it yields the highest expected utility among the programs runnable on the agent’s architecture. “This is a stronger guarantee than optimal metareasoning, but it is also harder to achieve” [Carlin & Zilberstein, 2011].

This is why asymptotic bounded-optimality was proposed [Russell & Subramanian, 1995]. It requires only that the agent’s program is not worse than any other program on its current architecture provided with a constant-times faster architecture (or with constant-times more capacity). In this sense bounded-optimality is similar to AIXI, which is also a universal rationality measure that is only asymptotically computable in practice. Nevertheless a computationally feasible, direct Monte-Carlo approximation [Veness et al., 2011] was provided for it recently, whose main ideas stem from POMCP [Silver & Veness, 2010], which is part of POMDPX_NUS [Ong et al., 2010], the planner winning the probabilistic Boolean POMDP track of this year’s International Planning Competition (ICAPS IPC-2011).

An AIXI agent is dual in comparison to a bounded-optimal agent in that the former first acts and then receives a percept and a reward as a result (general reinforcement learning scheme), while the latter first perceives the actual state of its environment and then acts according to its current percept history (intelligent/rational agent scheme). The two schemes can be connected as shown in [Hutter, 2005, Ch. 6], but we can also prove that AIXI converges to bounded-optimality (c.f. Section 3.2) and thus e.g. the above mentioned AIXI approximation is effectively an approximation of bounded-optimality.

All of the previous concepts are important measures of agents’ intelligence, but all of them rely on the simplifying assumption of a single agent. Extending them “to multi-agent settings is hard” [Carlin & Zilberstein, 2011], but it became a current topic of research. For example such an extension of optimal metareasoning was given in [Carlin & Zilberstein, 2011], but it actually works only for two collaborative agents, and in general has the same drawbacks as single-agent metareasoning. Moreover it should give rise to the problem of infinite regress in reciprocal (higher order) beliefs of agents as they start to reason about each other’s reasoning (which may be necessary for optimality).

In case of perfect rationality Game Theory [Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944] is an appropriate extension to decentralized decision making, but it inherently has the same problems as perfect rationality. Nonetheless it overcomes the issue of infinite regress of reciprocal expectations by assuming common knowledge of the game (and – in case of incomplete information – common priors). AIXI has no direct extension to the decentralized setting yet, and it is not trivial, since it would require consideration of several agents’ deliberation and actions, of which there is currently no trace (or place for) in the model. But since AIXI converges to bounded-optimality, our extension of it can be seen as an indirect decentralized extension of AIXI.

3. Preliminaries

As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the definition of agents’ utility is central to their definition of

\(^2\) AIXI stands for “Artificial Intelligence ξ “, where ξ is Solomonoff’s universal a priori probability distribution over the possible true environments [Hutter, 2005] tending to converge to the initially unknown, true a priori probability distribution μ.
rationality. A perfectly rational agent according to [Russell & Subramanian, 1995] corresponds to an agent function $f_{\text{opt}}$ such that

$$f_{\text{opt}} = \operatorname{argmax}_f (V(f, E))$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

An agent function, $f : O^t \rightarrow A$, is a mapping from the finite set of percept history prefixes $O^t = \{O^t[t \in T, O^T \in O^T]\}$ to the finite set $A$ of actions; $T$ is the finite, totally ordered set of time instants (with a unique least element, $0$); $O$ is the finite set of the agent’s possible percepts; and $O^T = \{O^T; T \rightarrow O\}$ is the set of all possible percept histories, where $O^T$ is a particular percept history. Thus a perfectly rational agent corresponds to a function that maximizes $V(f, E)$, where $E$ is a finite set of possible environments with a probability distribution $p$ over them.

An environment, $E \in E$, consists of a set $X$ of states with a distinguished initial state $x_0$, a transition function $f$ and a perceptual filter function $f_p$ such that $X^T(0) = x_0$, $O^T(t) = f_s(X^T(t))$, $A^T(t) = f_s(O^T()$ and $X^T(t + 1) = f_s(A^T(t), X^T(t))$ holds for all $t \in T$, where $X^T, T \rightarrow X$ is the state trajectory, and $A^T : T \rightarrow A$ is the action history produced by the agent.

Now $V(f, E)$ can be defined as the expected utility of $f$ in $E$ with a probability distribution $p$ over $E$ as follows.

$$V(f, E) = \sum_{\psi \in E} p(E) \cdot V(f, E)$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Here $V(f, E)$ denotes the utility of $f$ in $E \in E$.

$$V(f, E) = U(\text{effects}(f, E))$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

In Eq. 3 effects$(f, E) \in X^T$ stands for the state trajectory generated by $f$ in $E$; and so $U : X^T \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ denotes the utility function of the agent, a mapping from the set of state trajectories, $X^T$, to real numbers.

3.1 Convergence of AIXI to perfect rationality

One of our results is in showing that Hutter’s AIXI converges to a special case of perfect rationality based on the claim in [Hutter, 2005, p.146] that AIXI converges to AI$\mu$ as defined in [Hutter, 2005, p.130, Def. 4.4], and showing that AI$\mu$ corresponds to a special case of perfect rationality.

Definition 1 (The AI$\mu$ model). The AI$\mu$ model is the agent with policy $p^\mu$ that maximizes the $\mu$-expected total reward $r_1 + \cdots + r_m$, i.e. $p^\mu \equiv p^\mu = \operatorname{argmax}_p V^\mu_p$. Its value is $V^\mu_p \equiv V^\mu_{1m}$. [Hutter, 2005, p.130]

Policy $p^\mu$ corresponds to agent function $f_{\text{opt}}$ in Eq. 1, and generally a policy $p$ corresponds to an agent function $f$. The expected utility (called value function in AIXI) defined as $V^\mu_p \equiv V^\mu_{1m} \equiv \sum_q \mu(q) V^\mu_{1m}$ [Hutter, 2005, p.130] corresponds to Eq. 2 with $V^\mu_{1m}$ corresponding to $V(f, E)$; environment $q$ corresponds to environment $E$; probability $\mu(q)$ corresponds to $p(E)$ in Eq. 2; and total utility $V^\mu_{1m}$ corresponds to utility $V(f, E)$ as given in Eq. 3.

$V^\mu_p$ is defined as $V^\mu_{1m} = \sum_{i=1}^m r(x^p_i)$ in [Hutter, 2005, p.129], where $m$ denotes the lifetime of the agent, and corresponds to $|T|$; $r(x^p_i)$ is the reinforcement of an AIXI agent in cycle $i (i = 1, 2, \ldots, m)$ as seen in Def. 1; and $x^p_i \in X$ is the perception (input) of the AIXI agent in cycle $i$ (in case of $p$ and $q$) corresponding to $O^T(i) \in O$, so $X$ corresponds to $O$. According to Eq. 3 this means that $\sum_{i=1}^m r(x^p_i)$ corresponds to $U(\text{effects}(f, E))$, i.e. AI$\mu$ corresponds to a special case of perfect rationality, where the utility $U$ of the state trajectory effects$(f, E)$ – which corresponds to the unique I/O sequence $\omega^p = y_1^p x_1^p \ldots y_m^p x_m^p$ in AIXI – is calculated as the sum of rewards $r_i$ extracted from percepts at every time instant. Moreover, cycle $i$ in AIXI can be considered to correspond to time-interval $[i-1, i)$, so $y_i^p \in Y$ corresponds to $A^T(i-1) \in A$, $y_i$ corresponds $A$, and $O^T(0) = f_s(x_0)$ is an empty perception/string, $\epsilon$.

From the above we see that AI$\mu$ in Def. 1 corresponds to a special case of perfect rationality defined in Eq. 1 (with a simple linear utility$^3$, an empty initial percept, and a computable environment$^4$), implying that if AIXI converges to AI$\mu$, then AIXI eventually converges to this special case. The problem with this is only that perfect rationality is not feasible, which implies that in general AIXI is not feasible. To overcome this resource bounds need to be introduced.

3.2 Convergence of AIXI to bounded-optimality

In general resource bounded computation can be modeled with time- and/or space-bounded Turing machines. So from now on we model agents’ resource bounded architectures that interpret and run their programs with Turing machines. Let $M : L_M \times I \times O \rightarrow I \times A$ denote an agent’s architecture [Russell & Subramanian, 1995], a fixed interpreter for programs, where $(I^T(t + 1), A^T(t)) = M(\ell, I^T(t), O^T(t))$. $M$ has 3 inputs and 2 outputs. The inputs are: (1) the agent’s program $\ell \in L_M$, where $L_M$ denotes the finite programming language of $M$; (2) the current inner state of the agent at time $t, I^T(t) \in I$, drawn from the set of possible inner states $I$ (with initial state $i_0$), where $I^T : T \rightarrow I$ denotes the internal state history of the agent; and (3) the current percept of the agent at time $t, O^T(t) \in O$. The outputs of $M$ are: (1) the next inner state of the agent at time $t+1, I^T(t + 1) \in I$; and (2) the current action of the agent at time $t, A^T(t)$.

We can now define the subset of agent functions, that can be implemented on a given architecture $M$ as follows: Feasible$(M) = \{f | \exists \ell \in L_M, f = Agent(\ell, M)\}$, where

$^3$ Though simple, this utility function can be used for on-line reinforcement learning by maximizing expected future reward.

$^4$ The computability of the environment $q$ is a requirement in AIXI, but it is not mentioned in [Russell & Subramanian, 1995].
Agent(ℓ, M) denotes the agent-function implemented by ℓ running on M, if for any E, M generates an action history A^T for which f(O^T) = A^T(ℓ) holds. It would be pointless to discuss feasibility if M wasn’t time- and/or space-bounded.

Now a bounded-optimal agent with an architecture M for a finite set E of environments has a program ℓ_opt such that

\[ \ell_{opt} = \arg\max_{\ell \in \ell_{M}} (V(\ell, M, E)) \]  

(4)

We can calculate \( V(\ell, M, E) \), the expected utility of a program ℓ running on M in case of E similarly to Eq. 2.

\[ V(\ell, M, E) = \sum_{E \in E} p(E) \cdot V(\ell, M, E) \]  

(5)

Finally, by instantiating \( f = \text{Agent}(\ell, M) \) in Eq. 3 we get \( V(\ell, M, E) \), the utility of ℓ running on M in E.

\[ V(\ell, M, E) = V(\text{Agent}(\ell, M), E) \]  

(6)

The proposed correspondence with AIXI (if not as obvious as before\(^5\)) is mainly the same as in Section 3.1 except the following differences: policy \( p^* \) (c.f. Def. 1) now corresponds to the bounded-optimal agent-program \( \ell_{opt} \), which codes a Turing machine \( M_{\ell_{opt}} \) that is simulated by M on input \( (l^T(t), o^T(t)) \) for \( \forall t \in T \), thus M is a universal Turing machine (in accordance with [Hutter, 2005, Ch. 1.7.1, p21]), and generally every AIXI policy p should correspond to a program ℓ in a similar fashion. Expected utility \( V_p^\ell = \sum q \mu(q) V_p^{q, \ell} \) corresponds to Eq. 5, and total utility \( V_{1m}^{p, \ell} \) corresponds to \( V(\ell, M, E) \) in Eq. 6.

Now it would be too early to claim that AIXI converges to bounded-optimality, since we need to take limited resources into account. In AIXI both p and q are modeled with Turing machines which can be time- and/or space-bounded, but we will focus only on policies and programs, since bounded-optimality assumes no bounds on E. An AIXI policy p is time-bounded if it calculates its output in time ≤ t per cycle and space-bounded if its length\(^6\) is ≤ l. This approach is labeled AIXItl\(l\) in [Hutter, 2005, Ch. 7.2] and it is not conventional since usually space-bounds apply to the capacity of \( M_p \), the machine corresponding to p, and not to the universal Turing machine running p. So if in bounded-optimality a program ℓ corresponds to a t time- and/or l space-bounded AIXI policy p, then \( M_\ell \) should be t time-bounded and/or ℓ should be ≤ l bit long. This will be further refined in frames of our model (c.f. Section 4), but before that we need to address one more topic: semantics of time, which wasn’t a problem in Section 3.1, but now after the introduction of architectures it shall be considered.

AIXI measures time in cycles, while bounded-optimality in time steps. These two can correspond to each other as shown in Section 3.1, but then neither is a measure of computation time, just an indicator of I/O cycles. In AIXI this is made explicit: cycles are different than the computation time of policies. Section 4 in [Russell & Subramanian, 1995] on the other hand suggests that time steps should correspond to computation time, while they permit also our cycle-based interpretation. This ambiguity is also clarified in our model (c.f. next section).

For now we should conclude that bounded-optimality corresponds to \( A\mu \) with resource bounded policies, and that it is the limit to which AIXI with resource bounded policies converges. So eventually since every real implementation is resource bounded, any approximation of AIXI (e.g. [Veness et al., 2011]) is an approximation of bounded-optimality.

4. Decentralized extension of bounded-optimality

Now our main contribution, the decentralized extension of bounded-optimality is presented. Let \( N = \{0,1,2,\ldots,n\} \) be the set of agents in the environment, and let \( A_i \) be the finite set of possible actions of agent \( i \in N \). Similary to Section 3 we introduce a set of time instants, \( T \), a totally-ordered, finite set of non-negative integers (including 0). In our model \( \Omega \) denotes the states of an environment, so the set of possible state trajectories is defined as \( \Omega^T = \{\Omega^t | t \in T\} \), where \( \Omega^t \) is a state trajectory, a mapping from time instants to states. The prefix of a state trajectory \( \Omega^T \) till time t is \( \Omega^t = \{\Omega^t(u) | u \in T, 0 \leq u \leq t\} \) and so the set of possible state trajectory prefixes is \( \Omega^* = \{\Omega^t | t \in T, \Omega^T \in \Omega^T\} \). We can also define the set of action histories of agent i, \( A_i^T = \{A_i^T | T \rightarrow A_i\} \), where \( A_i^T \) is an action history of agent i. The prefix of an action history \( A_i^T \) of agent i till time t is \( A_i^t = \{A_i^t(u) | u \in T, 0 \leq u \leq t\} \) and \( A_i^T = \{A_i^t | t \in T, A_i^T \in A_i^T\} \) is the set of possible action history prefixes of agent i.

4.1 Specification of agents and environments

An agent is typically described as an abstract mapping (the agent function) from percept sequences to actions, but eventually those percept sequences arise from state sequences perceived by the agent, and this perception mechanism should also be part of the agent function, i.e. \( f_i: \Omega^T \rightarrow A_i (i \in N) \), mapping directly from state sequences to actions in order to capture the “complete physical functionality” of the agent. Moreover \( A_i^T(t) = f_i(\Omega^t) \) must also hold for \( t \in T \).

To model non-deterministic environments without loss of generality we assume (in accordance with extensive-form games) that an agent 0 represents chance, having an agent-function \( f_0: \Omega^T \rightarrow A_0 \), where \( f_0(\Omega^t) \) is chosen randomly according to probability distribution \( \pi_0(\Omega^t) \), where \( \pi_0: \Omega^T \rightarrow \Delta(A_0) \) denotes a random action policy, a function that maps from the set of state trajectory prefixes to the set
of probability distributions over $A_0, \Delta(A_0)$. The effects of agent $0$ are incorporated in the following definition of a state transition relation, $R \subseteq \Omega \times (\times_{i=0}^n A_i) \times \Omega$, which is similar to Def. 1 in [Bowling et al., 2002]. The set of actions that agent $i$ can perform in $\omega \in \Omega$ is implied by $R$, and are denoted with $ACT_i(\omega) \subseteq A_i$, (the do-nothing action should be part of $ACT_i(\omega)$ for every agent and state), and $R$ should satisfy the following two conditions:

1. For $\forall \omega \in \Omega$ state and $\forall a \in \times_{i=0}^n A_i \ \forall a' \in \Omega$ that $(\omega, a, \omega') \in R$,

2. If for a given $\omega \in \Omega$ and $a \in \times_{i=0}^n A_i \ \forall a' \in \Omega$ (where $\omega, a, \omega' \in R$),

The first condition is about completeness and determinism (for every state and executable action- combination there should be just one resulting state defined by $R$), and the second condition is about consistency (if an action- combination can’t be executed in a given state, then $R$ should not define any state resulting from its execution).

Definition 2 (Environment). An environment$^7$ is a 6-tuple, $E = (N, \Omega, \omega_0, T, \{A_i\}_{i \in N}, R)$, such that $\Omega^T(0) = \omega_0$, $A_i^T(t) = f_i(\Omega_t)$, and $(\Omega_t, (\times_{i=0}^n A_i^T(t)), \Omega_t(t+1)) \in R$.

State history $\Omega_t$ is determined by $E$ and agent functions $f_i (i \in N)$ which altogether are denoted by $f: \Omega^T \rightarrow \times_{i \in N} A_i$, the collective agent function, where $f(\Omega_t) = \langle f_0(\Omega_t), f_1(\Omega_t), \ldots, f_n(\Omega_t) \rangle$ for $\forall t \in T$. We can also define the functionality of all agents except agent $i$ as $f_{-i}(\Omega_t) = \langle f_0(\Omega_t), f_{-1}(\Omega_t), f_{+1}(\Omega_t), \ldots, f_n(\Omega_t) \rangle$, and for short we can write $f = \langle f_i, f_{-i} \rangle$. Similarly $A_i$ denotes the collective prefix of action histories $A_i^T(t)$ till time $t$, $A_i^T = \{A_i^T(u) \mid u \in T, 0 \leq u \leq t\}$, and $A_i^T$ denotes the collective prefix of action histories $A_i^T(t)$ till time $t$ except agent $i$ similarly to $f_{-i}$. For short: $A_i = \langle A_i^T, A_i^T \rangle$. Based on this effects ($f, E$) denotes the state history generated by a collective agent function $f$ operating in $E$.

4.2 Implementation of agents in environments

We will consider an agent (except agent 0) to consist of an architecture and a program (like hardware and software). The main difference between the original concept and our approach is that we model agents’ sensors and actuators as a part of their architecture, not the environment. Let $O_j$ denote the set of percepts of agent $j$ $(j = 1 \ldots n)$, so $O_j^T = \{O_j^T : T \rightarrow O_j\}$ is the set of percept histories of agent $j$, where $O_j^T$ is a percept history of agent $j$. The prefix of a percept history $O_j^T(u) \in O_j^T$ of agent $j$ till time $t$ is denoted with $O_j^T(u) \mid u \in T, 0 \leq u \leq t\}$, and the set of possible

\footnotesize

\[ \text{Definition 3 (Architecture). Architecture } M_j \text{ of agent } j \in \{1,2,\ldots,n\} \text{ is an } s(\cdot) \text{ space-bounded and/or } t(\cdot) \text{ time-bounded } k_j \text{-tape Embedded Universal Turing Machine, } M_j = \{I_j, A_j, \epsilon_j, \Sigma_j, i_0, F_j, \delta_j, f_{p_j}, f_{a_j}\} \text{ with a dedicated half-infinitely read-only input and half-infinitely readable/writeable output tape } (k_j \geq 2, k_j \in \mathbb{Z}^+), \text{ where} \]

- $I_j$ is the finite set of internal states of agent $j$;
- $A_j$ is a finite, non-empty set of the tape symbols;
- $\epsilon_j \in A_j$ is the blank symbol;
- $\Sigma_j \subseteq A_j \setminus \{\epsilon_j\}$ is the non-empty set of input symbols;
- $i_0 \in I_j$ is the initial state of the machine;
- $F_j \subseteq I_j$ is the set of final/accepting states;
- $\delta_j : I_j \times A_j^k \rightarrow I_j \times (A_j \times \{\leftarrow, \rightarrow, \downarrow\})^k_j$ is the transition function, where $\leftarrow$ is left shift, $\rightarrow$ is right shift, and $\downarrow$ is no shift of a head over a tape;
- $f_{p_j} : \Omega^T \rightarrow \Sigma_j$ is the many-to-one perceptual filter function of agent $j$, where $\Sigma_j$ is the set of finite, unbounded sequences of input symbols. The image of $f_{p_j}$ is $\text{Img}(f_{p_j}) = O_j \subseteq \Sigma_j$, thus $f_{p_j}$ models agent $j$’s sensors; it encodes its percepts on the input tape. The inverse of $f_{p_j}$ is the information function of agent $j$, $f_{o_j}^{-1} : \Sigma_j \rightarrow 2^N$; $f_{a_j} : A_j \rightarrow A_j$ is the surjective action function of agent $j$, where $A_j$ is the set of finite, unbounded sequences of tape symbols, thus $f_{a_j}$ models agent $j$’s actuators; it decodes the executable actions of agent $j$ from the output tape.

The content of the input and output tape of $M_j$ at any $t \in T$ is denoted by $input_j(t)$ and $output_j(t)$ respectively, where $input_j : T \rightarrow \Sigma_j^*$ and $output_j : T \rightarrow \Lambda_j^*$. Initially (at $t = 0$) the content of the input tape is $\ell_j(0) \# f_{p_j}(\Omega_0^T)$. The output tape is completely blank, and the heads are at the beginning of the tapes, over the first symbol. Let $head_j(t)$ denote the sequence of symbols under the heads at any $t \in T$, where $head_j : T \rightarrow \Lambda_j^k$. The language recognized by $M_j$ is $L_{M_j} = \{\ell_j \# o_j | \ell_j \in \mathcal{P}_{M_j} \subseteq \Sigma_j^*, o_j \in O_j \subseteq \Sigma_j^*\}$, where $\ell_j \in \mathcal{P}_{M_j} \subseteq \Sigma_j^*$ is a program and $\mathcal{P}_{M_j} \subseteq \Sigma_j^*$ is the programming language of agent $j$. $\ell_j$ is interpreted by $M_j$, so that there is a corresponding $M_{\ell_j}$ Turing machine, which is simulated by $M_j$, i.e. $M_j$ accepts, rejects or falls into an infinite loop given the input $\ell_j \# o_j$ iff $M_{\ell_j}$ accepts, rejects or falls into an infinite loop given the input $o_j \in \Sigma_j^*$.

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\[ ^7 \text{This definition of the environment is discrete and could be made continuous, but would introduce unnecessary complexity and it is not essential for our results, so we omit its discussion.} \]

\[ ^8 \text{Space-bound is a limit on the sum of non-empty cells on } k_j \text{ tapes.} \]

\[ ^9 \text{In accordance with [Aumann, 1976].} \]
respectively and \( f_{M_j}(\ell_j \# o_j) = f_{M_j}(o_j) \) for every \( o_j \in \Sigma_j \), where \( f_{M_j}: \Sigma_j \to \mathbb{N} \) and \( f_{M,j}: \Sigma_j \to \mathbb{N} \) denote the input-output functions implemented by Turing machines \( M_j \) and \( M_{t,j} \) respectively. Beyond that \( \delta_j \left( I^T_j(t), \text{heads}_j(t) \right) = I^T_j(t + 1), \text{write}_j(k(t), \text{move}_j(k(t)))_k \), \( \delta_j \left( I^T_j(0), \text{io}_j \right) = I^T_j(0) = \text{io}_j \), \( \delta_j \left( I^T_j(t), \text{input}_j(t) \right) = \text{io}_j \), \( \text{output}_j(t) \), \( I^T_j) \). \( f_{M_j}(\Omega^T(t)) \), \( \Omega^T(0) = o_0, \Omega^T(t) = f_{M_j}(\Omega^T(t)) \), \( \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \). \( f_{M_j}(\Omega^T(t)) \), \( \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \).

Now we can relate agents’ programs to their functions: a program \( \ell_j \in \mathcal{P}_{M_j} \) running on \( M_j \) implements an agent function \( f_j = \text{Agent}(\ell_j, M_j, E) \) (1) in \( E \) if \( f_j(\Omega^T) = A^T(t), A^T(t) = f_{M_j}(\text{output}_j(t)) \), \( \delta_j \left( I^T_j(t), \text{heads}_j(t) \right) = I^T_j(t + 1), \text{write}_j(k(t), \text{move}_j(k(t)))_k \), \( \delta_j \left( I^T_j(0), \text{io}_j \right) = I^T_j(0) = \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \). \( f_{M_j}(\Omega^T(t)) \), \( \text{io}_j \), \( \text{io}_j \).

Although every program \( \ell_j \) induces a corresponding agent function \( \text{Agent}(\ell_j, M_j, E) \) in \( E \), not every agent function has an implementation \( \ell_j \in \mathcal{P}_{M_j} \) in case of a given environment \( E \) and an architecture \( M_j \). We can define a subset of the set of agent functions \( f_j \) that are implementable on a given architecture \( M_j \) and programming language \( \mathcal{P}_{M_j} \) in environment \( E \) as follows: 

\[
\text{Feasible}(M_j, E) = \{ f_j \exists \ell_j \in \mathcal{P}_{M_j}, f_j = \text{Agent}(\ell_j, M_j, E) \}. \]

**4.3 Utility of decentralized agents**

We define a real-valued utility function over state trajectories for every agent \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \) to measure their performance in the environment: \( U_i: \Omega^T \to \mathbb{R} \). It implicitly defines their goal set by their user or Designer. Several (or all) agents can have the same user or Designer and thus the same utility function. A combination of an environment and the utility functions is a decentralized task environment.

\[ \text{V}_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) = E \left[ U_i \left( \text{effect}(f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) \right] \]

(7)

The value of agent \( i \) in a set \( E \) of environments \( \text{V}_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) \) with a probability distribution \( p \) over them, and with other \( f_{-i} \) agents is the expected value of Eq. 7.

\[ \text{V}_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) = \sum_{E \in \mathcal{E}} p(E) \cdot V_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) \]

(8)

Similarly, the value of \( \ell_i \) executed by \( M_i \) in \( E \) with other \( f_{-i} \) agents can be given simply by looking at the effects of the collective agent function \( f = (\text{Agent}(\ell_i, M_i, E), f_{-i}) \).

\[ \text{V}_i \left( \ell_i, M_i, f_{-i}, E \right) = V_i \left( (\text{Agent}(\ell_i, M_i, E), f_{-i}), E \right) \]

(9)

The value of \( \ell_i \) run by \( M_i \) in \( E \) with other \( f_{-i} \) agents is:

\[ \text{V}_i \left( \ell_i, M_i, f_{-i}, E \right) = \sum_{E \in \mathcal{E}} p(E) \cdot V_i \left( \ell_i, M_i, f_{-i}, E \right) \]

(10)

**4.4 Rationality of decentralized agents**

A perfectly rational agent \( i \) in the above setting has an agent function \( f_i \) that maximizes \( V_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) \) over all agent functions of \( i \), i.e. it has an agent function \( f_i^* \) such that

\[ f_i^* = \arg \max_{f_i} V_i \left( (f_i, f_{-i}), E \right) \]

(11)

As we see, other agents’ \( f_{-i} \) functionality is explicitly considered in this decentralized definition of perfect rationality. It means that this condition must be met by the agents to be perfectly rational in the decentralized case, but since \( f_i^* \) is independent of \( M_i \), it may be that \( f_i^* \) is not feasible, i.e. \( f_i^* \notin \text{Feasible}(M_i, E) \). For this reason we impose optimality constraints better on programs rather than agent functions. Agent \( i \) with architecture \( M_i \) is bounded-optimal for a set \( E \) of environments with other \( f_{-i} \) agents, if it has an agent program \( \ell_i^* \in \mathcal{P}_{M_i} \) such that

\[ \ell_i^* = \arg \max_{\ell \in \mathcal{P}_{M_i}} V_i \left( \ell_i, M_i, f_{-i}, E \right) \]

(12)

We can notice that \( \ell_i^* \) is a best-response to \( M_i, f_{-i}, \) and \( E \), but this does not mean that \( f_{-i} \) (or any part of it) should be also a best response like in Nash-equilibrium [Nash, 1951], so in this sense we are more general than Nash-equilibrium.

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15. It is an expected utility since the chance agent is also part of \( f_{-i} \).

16. All \( E \in \mathcal{E} \) should have same agents, states, time and actions. Only the initial state and the state transition relation may differ.

17. Observe that because all the elements of \( E \) should have the same agents, \( i \) is present in every \( E \in \mathcal{E} \). This is a necessary condition.
Nonetheless it can be hard to realize such a program. For this sake we propose the following relaxation: agent $i$ is time- or space-wise average-case asymptotically bounded optimal (ABO) in $E$ on $M_i$ with other $f_{-i}$ agents, if it has a program $\ell_i \in P_{M_i}$ such that $\exists k$ for which for $\forall \ell_i', V_i(\ell_i, kM_i, f_{-i}, E) \geq V_i(\ell_i', M_i, f_{-i}, E)$ holds. $kM_i$ denotes a variant of $M_i$, which is $k$ times faster (or has $k$ times more memory), i.e., the program is on the right lines, it only needs a better architecture. An initial idea for the realization of such programs in general was given in [Kovacs, 2005].

According to Def. 13 in [Russell & Subramanian, 1995] worst-case ABO could also be defined, but due to limited paper extent we omit it now. Still, based on their Def. 15 a decentralized notion of universal asymptotic bounded optimality (UABO) can be given: agent $i$ is UABO if it has a program $\ell_i \in P_{M_i}$ running on $M_i$ in $E$ with other $f_{-i}$ agents for a family of value functions $V_i$ iff $\ell_i$ is ABO in $E$ on $M_i$ with $f_{-i}$ in case of every value function $V_i \in V_i$. That means the program is flexible to (e.g., temporal) variation of the utility function, which is important for real-time systems.

We can extend all of the above decentralized rationality concepts (perfect rationality, BO, ABO, UABO) to a non-empty group of agents $G \subseteq N$ just by looking at them as one collective agent in $E$. Such a collective agent $G$ has a collective agent function $f_G: \Omega^* \to X_{i \in G} A_i$, where $f_G(\Omega^*) = (f_i(\Omega^*))_{i \in G}$ for $\forall \Omega \in T$ so that $f_i = Agent(\ell_i, M_i, E)$ holds for $\forall \Omega \in G$, $\forall E \in E$. The utility $U_G$ of $G$ is an arbitrary function of individual utilities, $U_G(\cdot) = h((U_i(\cdot))_{i \in G})$, where $h: \mathbb{R}[G] \to \mathbb{R}$ denotes an arbitrary real-valued function. The program, architecture or percept and action at time $t$ of the group is a combination of individual programs, architectures or percepts and actions at time $t$ of the members respectively. This way a group $G \subseteq N$ can be handled just like a single agent, and so the application of our above rationality concepts becomes straightforward.

### 4.5 Connection to the original concept

The original idea of bounded-optimality is a special case of our model if (1) $n = 1$ or (2) $G = N$. In the first case only 1 agent is modeled explicitly in a deterministic environment either because it is the only one or since other deterministic agents’ functionality is integrated into the transition function $f_G$, which corresponds directly to the state transition relation $R$. In the second case there may be multiple agents, but all of them are considered as a single collective agent $G = N$ in accordance with the end of Section 4.4.

In both cases chance agent $\theta$ is either not present or deterministic and $f_p = f_p G$ holds, so any (even implemented) agent function $f$ in the original concept corresponds to $f^* \in f_G = f^* \circ f_p G$ in our model where $f = f^*$.

18 $N \setminus G$ may include other groups of agents and agent $i \in N$ may belong to more groups.

19 Since in our model agent functions map from state trajectories.

### 5. Examples

Now we present a few examples of our model in case of a simplified Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) network-layer routing scenario [Tanenbaum & Wetherall 2011] (c.f. Fig. 1).

Let’s assume we have 5 static nodes for earth tremor measurement with limited amount of energy and 1 base station in 6 separate locations connected as in Fig. 1. Our goal is that the base receives measured data from every location, i.e. we need to design a protocol for nodes to realize this. A node can measure, send or aggregate data. Measurement takes 0.1 units of time and 1 unit of energy; sending takes 1 unit of time and energy. The cost of aggregation is negligible. Measurement produces data about the location of a node, which can then be either sent to another node or aggregated with received data. In case of aggregation the accuracy of aggregated data is reduced proportionally. Our question is: how should the nodes behave to accomplish our goal in the shortest time, with minimal overall energy usage and data inaccuracy?

To answer this question let’s model the situation. Let $N = \{1,2,3,4,5\}$ be the set of nodes (agents), and let $A_i = \{do-nothing, measure\} \cup \{aggregate(i, j)\}_{i,j, k,l \in \mathbb{N}} \times \{send(i,j,k)\}_{l,k \in \mathbb{N}, k \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the set of possible actions of agent $i = 1.5$, where $L \subseteq N \times N$ is the set of directed links between nodes as in Fig. 1. $A_B = \{do-nothing\}$, and set $\Omega$ of states is a special case of Section 4, where $\Omega = 2^P$, and $P = \{data at (i, j)\}_{i,j \in \mathbb{N}} \cup \{energy of (i, j)\}_{i,j \in \mathbb{N}}$ is the set of propositions, i.e. states have a logical description. The state transition relation $R$ should be according to the above informal description, with goal states being $\Omega_g = \{\omega \in \Omega | (data at (i, B))_{i=1,5} \subseteq \omega \} \subseteq \Omega$. Let the utility of agents be the same, $U_i = U$ for $\forall i \in N$, as follows.

$$U(\Omega^*) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \Omega^T(\tau_{max}) \in \Omega_g \text{ for } \forall \Omega^T \in \Omega^T \tau_{max} \text{ (13)} \\ 1/TOI(\Omega^T) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Here $TOI(\cdot) = \alpha_t \cdot (\cdot) + \alpha_e \cdot (\cdot) + \alpha_d \cdot (\cdot)$ denotes the Trade-off Index [Li et al., 2010] which we seek to minimize, and $\alpha_t, \alpha_e, \alpha_d \in [0,1]$ are coefficients of timespan $t(\cdot)$, overall energy usage $e(\cdot)$ and data inaccuracy $d(\cdot)$ of a state trajectory. $d(\cdot) = D_{gen}(\cdot)/D_{base}(\cdot)$ is the proportion of the number of data measured in the network, $D_{gen}(\cdot)$, and the
number of separate messages received by the base, $D_{\text{base}}(\cdot)$. $t_{\text{max}} = \max(T)$ denotes the latest time instant. We could extend this model to a probabilistic setting (e.g. packet loss, data generation rate, failure) by introducing a chance agent $\theta$, but for now we decided not to complicate things further.

**Example 1:** first let’s assume that initially node 1-5 has 2 units of energy as in Fig.1, i.e. $\omega_0 = \{\text{energy of (1,2)}\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}(B)$, and say $a_t = a_e = a_d = 1$. Since every agent has the same utility, they should aim for the same goal, i.e. it is rational to cooperate. It is easy to see what actions bounded-optimal programs $\{\ell_1\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ should choose by identifying optimal collective behaviors, which now are fully aggregating (every node should do a measurement at the very beginning simultaneously, then wait for farther nodes’ data to arrive, aggregate it with its own package, and then send the package toward the base along the shortest path as soon as possible). That is so because initially every node has only 2 units of energy, while measurement and sending both take 1-1 unit. So after a measurement a node can send only 1 message.

**Example 2:** now if node 4 would have 3 units of energy initially, then it would be worth for it to send not only 1, but 2 messages (e.g. its own data separately), i.e. to do partial aggregation to reduce data inaccuracy (from 5 to 2.5). I.e. a change of node 4’s resources modifies its bounded-optimal program while other BO agents remain fully aggregating.

**Example 3:** suppose that $a_t = a_d = 0$, but $a_e = 1$ in Example 1. In this case any collective behavior reaching the goal would have the same constant $T01(\cdot) = 5 \cdot 2 = 10$, which makes it impossible to distinguish among them. All of them would be bounded-optimal even if they wait for arbitrarily long with measurement or sending data. This is a limitation of our model: a strong dependence on the definition of utility (beside being discrete and allowing only finite sets of environments, agents, actions and perceptions).

### 6. Conclusions and future work

In this paper we introduced a decentralized notion of bounded-optimality (DBO), compared it with other rationality concepts, showed that it is an implicit multiagent extension of AIXI, because AIXI converges to BO, and connected DBO to the original notion of BO. A few examples were given to show the use and limitations of our approach, which is globally optimal if other agents’ $f_{-i}$ functionality is given (c.f. Eq. 12), otherwise it is difficult to achieve global optimality. There is no central mechanism posed upon the collective of agents, i.e. DBO agents can be analyzed in pre-existing environments with other users’ non-controllable agents (e.g. for assessing the performance of our Internet poker agent in a room filled with arbitrary competitors). We have also shown that DBO allows direct connection of feasible individual and group-level rationality in a straightforward way, which wasn’t possible until now.

In the future we wish to give a formal analysis of the asymptotic realization of DBO programs in general; extend our model to the continuous case, infinite sets of states, agents, actions and percepts; and to conduct a deeper investigation of individual and group-level rationality.

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### References


