


Authentication and authorization

Tóth Dániel, Micskei Zoltán




Security of computer systems

- Is it important?
- Is it important for everyone?
- When is it important?




When is security important?

- In every phase of software development
- *If the system was not designed for security, it is really hard to make it secure.*
- Security is determined by the weakest link.




What is security?

- „C.I.A.”: three related concepts
- Goal:
 - guarantee that the systems behaves always as expected
- One technology is usually not enough



Methods for security

- Cryptography
 - For the integrity and confidentiality of communication
- Platform-level intrusion detection
 - Integrity of the applications
- Network-level intrusion detection
- Redundancy, reconfiguration
 - For availability
- **Authentication, authorization**



Who is “authorized”?

Authentication

- Who am I?
- Am I really that?

Authorization

- What do I have access to?
- What can I do with it?

Content

- Short security introduction
- **User management, authentication**
 - UNIX, Linux
 - Windows
- **Authorization**
 - General methods
 - Role-based access control
 - Access control lists
 - Authorization on UNIX/Linux
 - Authorization on Windows

On the last lecture of the semester


Authentication

- How can be the identity of the user decided?
 - ...knows (e.g. password)
 - ...has (e.g. keycard, security token)
 - ...is (e.g. biometric, fingerprint)
- A (non-compromised) machine can decide the identity of the user using these methods
 - But what if the machine is compromised?
 - What to do with machine-machine communication?

Authentication

- Authentication on 3 levels:
 - Human–machine interaction
 - Machine–machine interaction over network
 - Between processes inside an OS
- Authentication **protocols** are needed
 - Machine–machine only the “knows” principle
 - But complex cryptographic primitives can be used

What is a user account?




For the system, the user is an object...

What is a user account?

- Unique identifier for an account
 - Linux, UNIX: UID (integer, root 0, users 1000-...)
- Further attributes of an account
 - Stored in /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/groups
 - Examples
 - Login name
 - Password
 - Home directory
 - Default shell
 - Real name...

- Stored in the following files:
 - /etc/passwd
 - /etc/shadow
 - /etc/group
- Create, delete, modify
 - useradd, usermod, userdel
 - groupadd, groupmod, groupdel
 - passwd

User account on Linux




- Identifying the identity of a process
 - `ps aux`, `pstree`, `/proc/$PID/status`
- Changing effective user és group runtime
 - `setuid`, `setgid`
 - `su`, `sudo`


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Authorization in general



Executing operations




General concepts

- Actors initiate *operations*
- The *context* of the operation includes the identifier of the actor, the protected object and the type of operation
- The policy *decision* component evaluates:
 - approves or denies the operation
- The policy *enforcement* component assures that the result is enforced

Challenges in authorization

- There are many actors in the system
 - Moreover: different systems identify the users differently
- There are many protected objects
- The whole relationship:
 - (Actors) X (Objects) X (Types of operation)
 - This is called *access matrix*
 - It is unmanageable, the whole matrix is huge!

Categorizing authorization methods



Category: Compulsoriness

- Classical concepts (US DoD standard)
- Mandatory
 - security policy is managed centrally
 - users cannot change the policy
- Discretionary
 - the owner of the resource can change the permissions

Category: type

- Integrity control
 - Labeling objects
 - Integrity level: high – low, public – secret
 - Typical validation:
 - lower level actor cannot read a higher level object
 - Bell-LaPadula (confidentiality) and Biba (integrity)


„No read up”
„No write down”

„No write up”
„No read down”


Category: type

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 - Typical validation:
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- Access control lists
 - object \rightarrow (actor, permissions)
 - Permission: read, write, execute...


Access control lists




Access control lists



Role-based Access Control (RBAC)




Hierarchy between objects



If there is a hierarchy between objects...

...a permission can be defined for a subtree of objects using inheritance

Groups



Group membership is a method for implementing RBAC

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
POSIX file system permissions

■ Basic concepts

- Acotr: user
- Hierarchy of actors: group
- A user can be member of several group
- A group can contain several user
- Group cannot contain an other group

■ Permissions

- 3x3 bit: read, write, execute (entering a directory)
 - First 3: for the owner of the object
 - Second 3: for the group of the object
 - Third 3: everyone else
- Special bits:
 - setuid, setgid: when running changes the uid, gid to the owner
 - sticky: sets the owner of new objects



- Changing owner: `chown`
 - can be executed only by the root
- Changing permissions: `chmod`
 - Only allowed to the owner of the object
 - Several styles for permissions:
 - 4 octal numbers
 - Changing e.g.: `u+x` (add execute for user), `g-w` (remove write for group)
- Listing:
 - `ls -l`
 - `ls -l -n`

Other privileges

- Root has special privileges:
 - Can set real-time class scheduling
 - Can access I/O devices directly (!)
 - Can listen on TCP ports below 1024
 - Can change kernel parameters, load kernel module, etc.
 - ...
- But this also should be modifiable
 - Principle of least privileges
 - Method: POSIX Capabilities (method for assigning global system-level privileges)